This article aims to study a strategic sector in the first years of the new millennium, whose results have been already been partially presented. It is structured into four main sections, which include the introduction, a presentation of the public sector of information and communication technologies, the
Introduction
The thoughtful and in every sense devastating global recession of recent years has invigorated an already long-standing debate about the different impact of crises on the pace, magnitude and
The work is part of a broader project, directed to study a strategic sector in the first years of the new millennium, some of whose results have been presented to the public 6 . The issues addressed in the manuscript are of great interest -restructuring in a key sector with R&D intensive firms (telecommunications). Methodologically it describes the changes that have taken place in the ICT sector in two related aspects: strategy and organizational structure. It belongs, then, to the category of a case study, contextualized within a broader discussion on privatization as well as restructuring in Western Europe and predominantly descriptive in nature, straddling industrial history with strategic management.
The research draws furthermore on extensive primary historical sources of both public and private origin together with reports and studies from large international organizations. The paper is structured into four main sections, which include the introduction, a presentation of the public sector of information and communication technologies, the restructuring of the public sector of ICTs and the birth of the Inisel group, called to play a prominent role in the future for its leadership in the setting up of the technological firm Indra.
Before moving forward, it is advisable to lay down a series of preliminary considerations about the content and scope of the topic addressed in order to better track the story. Firstly, information and communication correspond to industries and companies that use intensive cutting-edge technologies, particularly electronics (Mohr, Sengupta, and Slater 2009, 9) . As 6 Seminar "Industrialización, desindustrialización y reindustrialización en España. Lecciones de la historia reciente," Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, April 20-21, 2017 and the session "Industrialización, desindustrialización y reindustrialización en España" within the XIIh Conference of AEHE. Lecciones de la historia reciente", both organized by José L. García Ruiz and Jesús Mª Valdaliso to whom I thank your warm welcome to my work. To these papers I refer for a greater theoretical elaboration on the industrial policy and wider references to the existing bibliography.
Regarding terminological precisions, as established by the OECD, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are characterized by significant control maintained by the state through significant total, majority or minority ownership. Such definition includes companies that are owned by the central or federal government, as well as state enterprises of regional and local governments (Sturesson et al. 2015, 8) 8 .
In this sense, the value of state enterprises in the OECD area exceeded 2 trillion dollars and an employment of 6 million people. But their importance is determined not only by the weight they have in the productive economy (average of 2.5% of national employment), but also by being highly concentrated in strategic sectors on which large portions of the private economy depend. Significantly, half of state-owned companies by value operate in network industries (telecommunications, gas and electricity, transportation and postal services) (OECD 2014) . The strategic nature of the sector imposes a strong state intervention in its various facets of regulator, designer and policy inspirer, direct investor and buyer of products. In this last aspect, it is worth remembering the percentages higher than 70% of the total market in the communication equipment and minors in computers and office equipment of the large developed countries, with the sole exception of the USA (Locksley 1983, 74) .
It seems appropriate to draw the European framework in a global context where games are being made more and more between USA and Japan 9 . In the world production, the European As for comparative sense, some similarities and differences with other European countries are worth highlighting. The Italian case seems the most inspiring to carry out this exercise given the existence of a public body, which, on the other hand, had inspired the Franco dictatorship in Spain to create the INI. As for the similarities we find the existence of a telecommunication monopoly in the hands of the National (Baumol 1980; Kumar and Anjali 1994, 60-109) 12 . Some of the elements mentioned, particularly at the company level, point to certain interesting peculiarities that France presented, in the framework of a round trip nationalizations/privatizations. Beyond, one of the peculiarities of France was the existence of public R & D laboratories 13 .
Information and communication technologies at the INI
At the beginning of the decade of 1980, Spain aligned among the European countries with companies heavily owned by the state, although with a degree below the average of the EC 14 .
The adjustment policies of the public sector are part of the broader reconversion carried out by the socialist governments in the 1980s, largely as an adjustment for entry into the EC. Data available show that GDP annual growth from 1979 to 1996 only overpass a three percent 12 There were nine companies of electronic components, one of which -Piher-with four subsidiaries: Ministerio de Industria y Energía (1983, 163-164; 170-173) . In 1993, the market for electronic components amounted to 168 billion pesetas, representing 14% of the total market, 15 percentage points less than ten years earlier. (Burgess 2004, 25-26) .
Under Luis Carlos Croissier at the INI, the government promoted the recovery of the prestige of public companies. Secondly, it encouraged the privatization of numerous companies of the public group in which certain specialists point as a "dual process" of privatizations in the INI, which seemed to have expected the active participation of the autochthonous financial capital and that of foreign multinationals 16 .
Through successive transformations, the Spanish public productive sector was grouped into three holdings: the Group of the National Institute of Industry (INI), which was divided into two sub holdings and covered the basic and strategic industries; the INH Group, which brought together the hydrocarbons sector (oil, gas and petrochemicals) and the Patrimony Group, which encompassed service and banking companies (Aceña and Comín 1991, 539) 17 .
The electronics had arrived late and timidly to Spain, coinciding with the dawn of the democratic transition. Part of the efforts came from the public sector through the INI and indirectly through CTNE 18 . In subsequent years, the purposes of developing the cutting-edge technology and electronics sectors fell short. At the beginning of the new millennium, Spanish electronic production represented 5.5% of European production, 3.5 percentage points below 15 Carreras and Tafunell (2004) ; Bliss and Braga De Macedo (1990, 193) claim that the adjustment resulted in significant growth in the economy, at the expense of maintaining a high level of unemployment; see also Prados (2017) . 16 This "dual process" of privatizations in the INI would have begun with a financial restructuring and followed with a sale to buyers who were favored by the operation: Heywood (1999, 171) . 17 For an analysis of the restructuring of the public sector see Parker (2002, 200) . 18 For an overview, see Duch-Brown and Fonfría (2014, 1 Calvo (2014, 222-224) . After a period of marginalization of industrial defense policy, in the early years of the 1980s the Spanish government, very aware of Western military alliances, began to pay attention to this forgotten sector: Latham and Hooper (2013, 147) . Let's place ourselves in 1984, taking advantage of a diagnosis and various recipes from the INI itself. At that time, the electronics area of the INI was composed of a set of ten public or mixed companies, belonging to three large fields -computers, electronics for the defense, and civil electronics-, from which consumer electronics and components were excluded ( Figure 1 ). The main customers were diverse organisms of the national defense sector (Appendix 1 and 2) 20 .
Regarding the productive structure, the computer science area headed the activity of the division with 45% of the turnover, followed by the electronics for the defense with 30%, while the civil 20 It had a sales volume of 25,576 million pesetas, of which 15.83% corresponded to exports, the order book stood at 26,275 million ptas., and employment at 3,581 people: Reorganización de empresas electrónicas del INI.
Creación de un holding en el sector electrónico-informático del INI, INI Archives. As an example, EISA's R & D department employed 49 people in 1983, almost a quarter of which were senior graduates and 220 million pesetas had been allocated to it, 6% sales (the overwhelming majority for development and preparation of prototypes and the remaining 11 million for material investments in laboratory equipment); as for the origin, 79 million pesetas came from external financing (CAYCIT and CDTI, mainly): EISA (1984) . Four years before, the share capital of the division was 3,266 million ptas., its sales were 7,688, and its and node of the Spanish data transmission network. The activity of AEREA, software company of the division, was due to the development of a programming language, object of an export agreement with one of the most important North American multinationals of the software and that had managed to penetrate the world market. For its part, the subsidiary of AEREA, called ERVISA, provided services in the field of computer-aided design and manufacturing. The division also planned entering new fields, giving priority to computer-aided teaching and robotics. But significantly for its positioning in the market, the division aspired not so much to manufacture robots, despite having its own technology, but to offer the country an engineering skills in robotics 25 .
The strategy of internationalization of activities was added to the demand for expansion, diversification and the struggle to be at the vanguard. In a group of relatively small size, this strategy meant not only the aforementioned export but also the establishment of bridgeheads or nuclei of expansion in the markets with the greatest potential. These were basically three, 24 El País, December 7, 1983; Spanish Economic News Service, 38, 1-51: 9. and Ibero-America. In the first, the division had two bridge heads, the beginnings of two actions and perspectives of a third. In the EEC, possibly in the Netherlands for fiscal reasons, the INI planned to set up a mixed software company in a technological alliance with a French group and from its own company. Regarding Latin America, already an important market, the intention was to create a platform, possibly in Argentina, for which institutional relations were being established with the government of that country 26 .
The INI continued betting on a Spanish business group strengthened, consolidated, stable in the long term and capable to ensure, either alone or in partnerships, national participation in European industry and services. This required, however, to adopt divestment or participation measures in certain businesses (Salas 1991) .
Later on the cuts continued, which the opposition did not fail to throw in the face of the government. In this regard, investments in R & D of the Ministry of Industry and Energy (MINER) suffered a significant contraction of 13%, equivalent to about 7,000 million pesetas (Triana 1991, 8-9 ; Report of the Senate proceedings, 111, November 19, 1991, 31-34) .
The government then countered the attacks with the full force of the National Electronic and Information Plan (Plan Electrónico e Informático Nacional) for almost a decade and the launch of the Industrial Technology Action Plan (Plan de Actuación Tecnológica Industrial, PATI). 
The restructuring of the public sector of ICTs
Returning to the sector that concerns us in the early years of the 1980s, reality left little room for doubt. In SECOINSA a capital injection of 5,000 million pesetas was envisaged by the INI in 1983, with a positive effect on the income statement then in the red. But the financial reinforcement was followed by divestment with the sale of the stake in SECOINSA to 27 Comparecencia del señor director general de electrónica y nuevas tecnologías, Diario de Sesiones del Senado (Report of the Senate proceedings), 111, 19 November, 1991, 31-34. In the autonomous communities and, as an example, the competitiveness plan of the Catalan industry included four areas of preferred actioninternationalization, research and technology, services to companies, industrial and territorial rebalancing-, which distributed the bulk of 44,150 million ptas: Mosconi et al. (2001) . It is worth remembering that the supranational European policy of R & D promotion responded to the failure of national policies: Kassim and Menon (2002, 228) . 28 Desarrollo Tecnológico 6, January 1994, 11-12, and 50; to this we should add the Industrial Quality Plan. In a situation where global defense spending tended to decrease, the cooperation efforts turn out to be very important. For its part, the aspirations of North American industry to gain a foothold in the European market offered favorable ground for such inter-company collaboration. Therein lie the ingredients of the "occasional" strategic alliance in two phases between the US multinational Hughes and Inisel. The first consisted of a triple shareholding movement -Hugues' entry as a minority partner in the capital of ENOSA, of the Inisel group-, the transfer of cutting-edge optronics technology from ENOSA to Hughes, and the manufacture in Spain of a new launcher of missiles TOW, this time in charge of Inisel with technological contribution of the partner. The agreement was completed with the joint development of a new 32 As a nominated national producer and participant in the two proposed competing systems, Inisel, like AEG and FIAR, was guaranteed its share in industrial production, regardless of the chosen radar system; on the contrary, Ferranti ran the risk of being excluded from participation in manufacturing: Disco and van der Meulen (1998, 91) 2%; between 1982 and 1993 , the percentage with respect to the total budget fell to less than half -from 11.5% to 5.1%: Canales and Elices (1994, 107) . 34 Between 1980 and 1984 the average cumulative growth of the group of companies was 32% in sales, 150% in cash-flow and 6% in employment.
Online We must remember that the electronic sector had as a peculiarity the great speed of technological change together with strong competition from the international industry. The strong growth of the INI's division brought to light unforeseen problems at the time of its creation, essentially the structure not suited to the needs. If we go specifically to the criteria, the restructuring of the electronic and computer division of the INI pursued several objectives. They included rationalizing the offer from the various companies in the group; technological complementarity and specialization; the use of common resources and capacities in order to optimize their use and allow shared access to unavailable resources to an individual initiative; the coordination of actions of international projection that guarantee their viability; agility and decision-making in the mechanisms for making investments, launching new activities, commercial action, purchases, making use of human resources, together with the allocation of resources based on the needs derived from a joint strategy.
The lack of integration of the companies caused the loss of economies of scale, the duplication of activities and resources and the dispersion of effort in small units. The achievement of these economies of scale was also possible through the coordination of purchases, which in 1984 had saved 500 million pesetas.
The by the division-. Once the absorption was chosen as a form of integration, deciding the absorbing company and the dissolved one depended on the lower fiscal costs. In that sense, EESA had to absorb EISA to maintain the right to compensation for losses existing in EESA.
was 60 million pesetas in cash, 98 in the form of self-financing and a transfer of the INI's securities portfolio for 3,657 million pesetas. 
Birth and growth of the Inisel group
Inisel presented the INI with a proposal for an organizational plan that clarified the previous organization chart submitted for approval on October 9, 1985, and above all justified such an organization chart, including definitions of functions or activities to be carried out in the main units in the new organization chart or in the context of the definitions of functions or activities.
Inisel picked up the suggestions made at the time by the management and structure management policy. In the new proposal, up to seven main objectives to be achieved in the organizational aspect were completed. In essence, they entailed the creation of an industrial group subject to a common business strategy and action with a flexible hierarchical and organizational unit to respond to emerging and very changing markets, composed of operational management units lightened of non-executive functions and with management and executive units of command clearly defined.
The organizational scheme contained in the proposal basically saw eye to eye with the previous one and consisted in the creation of three operational managers, a common economic financial management, an executive committee, a steering committee, a technical and prospective planning management, an address of human resources and a corporate policy unit.
The proposal also included the organization charts and brief descriptions of functions or activities to be carried out by the main units. Finally, a plan for the implementation of the proposed organization was indicated. The main suggestion made by the Directorate of structure Inisel carried out a diagnosis of the group's situation, as a step prior to a strategic reorientation.
A state of affairs too dispersed, disorganized, with excessive lines of business unclear was found. From this arose a consensual orientation to the reordering, especially considering that the sector was concentrating at great speed worldwide (Ballart 2001, 125) .
As a result, Inisel suffered significant changes in the organizational structure, the basis for changes in the work systems of the group. Firstly, it was a generational change in the management team, grounded on the internal promotion of young professionals but with specific technological knowledge in substitution of senior management, barely oriented to the market and with low recycling options. Regarding changes in work systems, Inisel was inclined to focus on results, developing more agile coordination mechanisms and implementing a monthly reporting system, prioritizing customer satisfaction. In other words, it guided company managers to define specific objectives and to systematize operational monitoring mechanisms that measure achievements. It involved the selective rethinking of the activities in which Inisel participated, with the consequent rejection of certain lines of business to focus efforts on other (Ballart 2001, 129) .
Conclusion
This article brings us back to the beginning of the debates on the reconversion policies in Spain and on the role of high technology in them. It has addressed the reshaping of the public electronic industry after the sudden turn that followed the expansive phase experienced in the Union and its full integration and, therefore, implies the policies of prior readjustment, the submission to the European guidelines and the use of horizontal and sectoral plans (Henderson 1991 ).
The empirical evidence shows that the Spanish industrial restructuring, in times of crisis and globalization, managed by State was not oriented to pave the way for subsequent privatizations but in search of greater competitiveness -consolidation and rationalization-of the public sector.
Evidence presented shows the connection of the sector with the military industry, possibly one of the main strategic reasons for the ICT sector to remain under public control. It must be said, however, that some companies have ended up in the private sector, as it happened to INITEC, and others have served as a basis for creating joint companies, as it was the case of Indra.
The processes described here to define the behavior of the INI in the ICT sector seem to fit appropriately in terms of consolidation of companies, rationalization search for economies of scale to compete in open markets and internationalization.
In short, what has been investigated here is the configuration of a Spanish group specialized industrial group, which currently has a rather minor relative importance in the international scene.
